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Abstract: The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to 
rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward 
compatibility moderates this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the 
U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents 
transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces 
supply of new software. We examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward 
compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap 
between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward 
compatibility as a strategy to sustain market leadership. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms frequently achieve a position of (temporary) market leadership in high-technology industries 
(Lee et al. 2010, Wade 1995). Especially in the early stages of a technology’s life cycle, this can lead 
to a dominant design for a technology (Suarez and Utterback 1995). In industries with significant 
network effects, the tendency for an industry (or a technological generation) to be dominated by a 
single firm or standard is especially strong (Arthur 1989). This pattern of market leadership in 
technology-intensive industries creates incentives for firms to invest in continuous learning (Schilling 
2002), build a technological community (Wade 1995), exploit complementarities across products 
(Lee et al. 2010), or engage in aggressive pricing (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2007), among others. 
Securing an early lead can therefore translate into a competitive advantage throughout a 
technological generation (Arthur 1989, Mascarenhas 1992, Lieberman 1989). 
Interestingly, in network industries, market leadership often persists across generations, which 
suggests that providers of successful technologies can carry over some of their dominance to future 
generations. The strategy literature identifies a number of mechanisms by which this 
intergenerational transfer of market leadership can take place. One stream of literature proposes 
that incumbent firms possess dynamic capabilities developed from prior generations that are useful 
in the new generation  (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2007, Chen et al. 2012, Danneels 2002, Kotha 
et al. 2010, Eggers 2012). The core logic here is that firms are better at managing a new technology 
because they have learned how to do so in a prior one. Another line of research suggests that firms 
utilize complementary assets acquired in a previous product generation (Rothaermel and Boeker 
2008, Hill and Rothaermel 2003, Jones 2003, Tripsas 1997). A specific form of leveraging 
complementary assets from a previous technological generation is to maintain backward 
compatibility with the old generation (Shapiro and Varian 1999). 
Our paper studies if backward compatibility by the market leader can be a strategy to sustain market 
leadership across generations. We pose three questions about the nature and implications of 
backward compatibility in markets with network effects: 
1. How does backward compatibility influence demand for a new product generation? 
2. How does backward compatibility affect the supply of new complementary products? 
3. Are the effects of backward compatibility moderated by technological progress? 
We analyze the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, which is well-suited for our questions 
because i) backward compatibility is possible, but not necessary and ii) generation changes can be 
identified clearly. Handheld consoles are especially interesting as they exhibit different degrees of 
technological change across generations, so we can analyze the tradeoff between backward 
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compatibility and technological progress across generations. Existing work in  the market for home 
video game consoles studies asymmetric network effects (Shankar and Bayus 2003), changes of 
indirect network effects over the product life cycle (Clements and Ohashi 2005), software exclusivity 
(Corts and Lederman 2009) and blockbuster software (Stremersch and Binken 2009). While these 
papers handle multiple generations they do not explore how backward compatibility affects 
generational change and market leadership, except for Clements and Ohashi (2005), who address 
backward compatibility by adding available games for the Playstation 1 to those of the Playstation 2. 
The theoretical literature on cross-generational or ‘vertical’ compatibility (Katz and Shapiro 1994) 
studies firm incentives for backward compatibility. Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994) find that price 
discrimination increases compatibility incentives, while Kende (1994) argues that backward 
compatibility is more likely as valuations for old and new technologies are similar and building an 
installed base of complementary products is expensive. These results are confirmed in a simulation 
model by Lee et al. (2003), who find that low valuation for backward compatibility and a small 
installed base advantage of the old generation render backward compatibility less likely. Nahm 
(2008) finds that profits for the incumbent are higher with backward compatibility, which may 
increase its incentives to upgrade beyond the social optimum (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). From a 
demand perspective, Shy (1996) finds that backward compatibility increases the rate of new 
technology adoption. 
The empirical literature on cross-generational compatibility finds that backward compatibility helps 
carry over some installed base advantage to future generations. Liikanen et al. (2004) and Koski and 
Kretschmer (2005) study intergenerational effects between the first and second generations of 
mobile telephony and confirm the positive impact of backward compatibility. Greenstein (1993) 
finds that buyers are more likely to select a new mainframe computer system if they own a 
compatible predecessor system. Gandal et al. (2000) study audio technologies and run a 
counterfactual by assuming backward compatibility of CD and vinyl. Compatibility would have 
accelerated diffusion by 1.5 years. 
We estimate demand for handheld video consoles as well as supply of game titles. Our estimation 
strategy builds on Clements and Ohashi (2005), extending their approach to account for backward 
compatibility, console age and the level of technological progress from one generation to the next. 
Further, we identify console characteristics to allow for a meaningful comparison between the 
effects of backward compatibility and increased console performance. In line with prior work, we 
find that backward compatibility positively affects demand for a new generation. In addition, we find 
that: i) backward compatibility works through the installed base of software of the compatible 
4 
parent generation, ii) it increases demand for hardware, but decreases supply of software, and iii) 
backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. 
We capture a (demand-enhancing) direct and a (demand-reducing) indirect effect of backward 
compatibility. The former directly influences the adoption decision through the installed base of 
software for the compatible parent generations. This effect weakens for higher technological leaps 
between generations. The latter works indirectly as old software partly substitutes for new software 
and thus lowers new software demand, reducing software supply, which in turn decreases hardware 
demand. The demand-enhancing effect outweighs the demand-reducing effect so that backward 
compatibility helps transfer network effects across generations. Indeed, we find that the market 
leader, Nintendo, was able to maintain its market leadership across multiple generations through a 
strategy of backward compatibility. 
This paper is structured as follows. We first give an overview of the U.S. market for handheld game 
consoles. We then develop our hypotheses and test them using a model of hardware demand and 
software supply. A discussion of our results follows. Further, we analyze the role of backward 
compatibility in maintaining market leadership by performing a counterfactual experiment and 
considering alternative explanations. Finally, we conclude. 
2. Industry background 
The market for handheld game consoles first took off with the appearance of Nintendo’s Game Boy 
in 1989, the first device to sell to the mass market (Forster 2005). Handheld game consoles are – just 
as their (immobile) home video game counterparts – part of a system comprising both hard- and 
software. Hardware manufacturers supply consoles and often also software titles,1 while software 
providers concentrate on the development and distribution of games. Given indirect network effects 
(Clements and Ohashi 2005), hardware suppliers have an interest to encourage development of 
complementary products, namely game titles. Since the ‘Atari shock’ in the early 1980s (when the 
game console market collapsed due to a sharp increase in poor game titles), hardware suppliers 
actively manage quality of the market’s software side: developers need to sign detailed licensing 
contracts which are then enforced by legal and technological means such as security chips (Genakos 
2001). This also prevents any hardware manufacturer from developing consoles that are compatible 
with games for other platforms. 
                                                          
1
 On average, hardware manufacturers produced 12.8% of game titles for their consoles. 
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Our sample ranges from 1995 to 2007.2 Industry observers typically separate consoles into 
generations. In industry terminology, we study generations IV to VII (Forster 2005). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the consoles in the generations we study. It is striking that Nintendo 
– from IV up to VII – was continuously present in the market while its competitors changed 
continuously. Figure 2 illustrates Nintendo’s market share dominance over the whole period. We 
now describe the competitive landscape over the four technology generations we cover. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Generation IV comprised Nintendo’s Game Boy and Game Boy Pocket, and Sega’s Game Gear. At the 
start of our sample in 1995, these consoles had already been on the market for some time. The 
devices basically shared the market, with Nintendo’s share ranging between 60% and 80% and 
Sega’s moving between 20% and 40% accordingly. 
The generation V console Game Boy Pocket reached market shares exceeding 80% from 1998 on. 
This is remarkable considering that: i) the device was basically a remake with a smaller body but the 
same hardware capabilities as its predecessor, the Game Boy, and ii) Tiger Electronic’s Game.com, 
which had superior hardware capabilities, had also been launched in the meantime. Nintendo’s 
Virtual Boy – in contrast to the company’s other products – was comparably unsuccessful due to its 
bulkiness, problems during use3 and little software available. It only reached substantial market 
share through a harsh price cut aimed at reducing stockpiles.4 The Game.com Pocket Pro, a lighter 
and less bulky remake of the Game.com, did not even reach 1% market share. 
The next dominant device was Nintendo’s Game Boy Color, which again was not the technically most 
advanced console of its time. Its main differentiating feature was the enormous installed base of 
backward compatible software titles from its predecessors. While its competitors did not have an 
installed base of existing games, the Game Boy Color could build on millions of software copies sold 
in the almost ten years the Game Boy platform had been on the market. Game Boy Color users did 
not have to wait for availability of new games and could buy or swap used games straight away. 
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 Extending the study period beyond 2007 would be problematic as smartphones (with Apple’s iPhone as the 
most prominent representative) have since then developed to be close substitutes to dedicated handheld 
game consoles. 
3
 Nintendo Virtual Boy’s image generation was based on a combination of a LED unit and oscillating mirrors. 
Users had to focus on these mirrors while playing which caused many players headaches. Hence, the Virtual 
Boy bore a warning statement that it may cause headaches from the start of retail availability in the United 
States (Kent 2002, pp. 513-515). 
4
 The maximum market share reached by the Virtual Boy was 44%, reached after cutting the initial price of 
more than $160 to less than $30 in April 1997. 
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The next generation (VI) started with the Game Boy Advance. The device, which featured improved 
hardware power on the one hand and backward compatibility to Game Boy Color games on the 
other reached market shares close to 100% at the top of its cycle. While there was no device on the 
market at that time matching the Game Boy Advance in terms of hardware power, attributing its 
dominance merely to weak competition would be simplistic. Backward compatibility allowed users 
to draw on a game library comprising more than 46 million Game Boy Color titles from the outset, 
which clearly contributed to its success. 
In early 2003 Nintendo launched the Game Boy Advance SP, a facelifted Game Boy Advance with 
identical technology but a new body design and minor screen improvements. It matched its 
predecessor’s success, completely dominating the market at the top of its cycle. It prevailed not only 
over dated devices like the Neo Geo Pocket Color but also over Nokia’s N-Gage, which had a 
processor more than 6 times faster than the Game Boy Advance SP. 
At the end of 2004 Nintendo launched generation VII of handheld game consoles. Compared to the 
previous generation, the Nintendo DS was a significant improvement in terms of hardware 
performance. The device was again backward compatible and could play Nintendo’s generation VI 
games. However, in this generation Nintendo shared the market with Sony. Sony’s Playstation 
Portable (PSP) started with a market share exceeding 50% and then ranging between 20% and 40%. 
This is remarkable given that Sony had to start from scratch in the business while Nintendo again 
had a strong installed base of games. The PSP was the most powerful handheld console ever and 
outperformed the DS by far – for example, it was nearly five times as fast as Nintendo’s DS. At the 
end of our study period both players Nintendo and Sony launched remakes of their consoles: the DS 
Lite and the Playstation Portable Slim. Both are lighter and possess a smaller body than their 
predecessors. 
Throughout the generations we study, Nintendo was successful, except with the Virtual Boy. At least 
part of its success may be due to the enormous installed bases of games leveraged by the company 
through backward compatibility. Sony’s success suggests that such dominance may be overcome by 
significant technological progress. While many companies failed in challenging Nintendo with 
consoles roughly on par, Sony’s Playstation Portable, which outperformed Nintendo’s DS by far, 
gained substantial market share quickly.5 
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 Note that in this industry, success is typically measured in terms of market share.  
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3. Hypotheses 
We now derive hypotheses on the effect of backward compatibility on hardware demand and 
software supply. We first discuss how backward compatibility works directly and indirectly. We then 
argue why we expect the effect of backward compatibility to be less strong for larger technological 
leaps. To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically test both the positive and negative effects of 
backward compatibility and the effect of technological progress. 
3.1. Direct influence of backward compatibility on hardware demand 
When an incumbent launches a technologically improved product generation, it usually faces 
competition from two directions: from the incumbent’s parent generation and from products 
offered by competing firms. The larger the incumbent’s installed base and the more fragmented the 
new generation, the more difficult it is to overcome this startup problem, causing excess inertia 
(Farrell and Saloner 1985, Kretschmer 2008) or technological lockout (Schilling 2002). In markets 
with indirect network effects, firms face a chicken-and-egg problem: it is not enough to offer a new 
video console; consumers also expect to choose from a wide variety of games for it (Clements and 
Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009, Gupta et al. 1999, Gandal et al. 2000). 
Gandal et al. (2000) identify three strategies for markets with indirect network effects to overcome 
startup problems. Firms can (1) subsidize hardware, (2) increase software availability by forward 
integration, and (3) make the product backward compatible with the parent generation. All three 
strategies are used in the videogame market. Especially shortly after product launch, consoles are 
often sold at or below marginal costs. Most console manufacturers also develop and publish games 
on their own to increase availability of software for their own consoles (Corts and Lederman 2009). 
The strategy we focus on in this paper is the use of backward compatibility to transfer network 
effects across generations, also widely used in the video games industry. 
In the market for handheld game consoles, backward compatibility implies that game cartridges of 
the parent generation can still be used with the new console generation. If the physical format of the 
game cartridges changes, this may even require a second cartridge slot.6 Backward compatibility is 
costly for the console manufacturer: the enclosure has to be bigger, additional parts are needed, and 
the processor must be able to process the old games. 
How will backward compatibility work exactly? Indirect network effects in the videogame industry 
have so far been measured through the demand-increasing effect by the number of games currently 
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 This was the case for the Game Boy Advance, which had one slot for old Game Boy Color cartridges and one 
for new Game Boy Advance ones. 
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offered on the market (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009). One way to assess 
the effect of backward compatibility could be to analyze if and how much the number of games still 
available for the compatible parent generation affect demand for the new generation. Alternatively, 
the stock (or installed base) of games sold for the parent generation would proxy all games that 
could potentially be used with the new console. This measure, which we feel is more plausible since 
buying old games for a new console generation may be somewhat unattractive, implies that a larger 
installed base of compatible games increases the likelihood that a potential adopter has access to 
some of these games and thus benefit from backward compatibility. A person has access to old 
games if she owns the parent console or gets old games from friends or through second-hand 
trading.7 
The results by Greenstein’s (1993) support our intuition in another setting: he finds the likelihood of 
adopting a new-generation mainframe to be higher if a firm owns a previous-generation mainframe 
of the same brand. Given the switch of mainframes is a binary (hardware) decision, while the 
software used on the previous mainframe can be used with the new mainframe, the availability of 
existing software, and not sales or software development post-hardware purchase, is what affects 
demand for hardware. This is summarized in our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Backward compatibility increases hardware demand more the higher the prior 
generation’s installed base of software. 
3.2. The dark side of backward compatibility 
In addition to the direct effect of complementary goods on the baseline product, backward 
compatibility can also have a negative impact on the new generation. This negative impact stems 
from the fact that complementary goods from both generations are substitutes for each other. In 
the console market this implies that a new console can be used to run games from the current 
generation as well as compatible games from the previous one. Given that most games are provided 
by independent developers,8 this implies that developers of new games will face more competition – 
not only from competitors in the same generation, but also from their predecessors (Kretschmer 
2008). Given the fixed-cost nature of game development, developers will expect less revenues to 
cover their (sunk) fixed costs, so that their incentive to develop and release new games – basically, 
to enter the new generation – decreases (Sutton 1998). Therefore, what may be beneficial for the 
hardware market because there is a stock of complementary goods available may be harmful for the 
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There is a sizable second-hand market for console games. E.g., on eBay.com, as of 24 January 2012, a total of 
108,466 used games for mobile devices were offered. 
8
 In our sample, only 12% of games were published by one of the hardware manufacturers. 
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software market because it decreases the incentives to develop software for the new generation. 
This is summarized in our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Backward compatibility decreases supply of software titles for the new generation 
more the higher the prior generation’s installed base of software. 
This hypothesized effect represents the ‘dark side of compatibility’. Therefore, the net effect of 
backward compatibility is determined by two countervailing effects: First, the direct effect of 
backward compatibility suggests that availability of games for the compatible parent generation 
serves as a (part-)substitute for variety of new games, increasing hardware demand. Second, the 
indirect effect of backward compatibility implies that the substitution of new games by old games 
reduces new software demand, which in turn lowers software supply, which eventually reduces 
hardware demand. 
3.3. Backward compatibility and technological progress 
Our final set of hypotheses addresses the potential tradeoff between backward compatibility and 
technological progress. Shapiro and Varian (1999) identify this as the tradeoff between ‘evolution’ 
(ensuring backward compatibility but offering limited technological improvement) and ‘revolution’ 
(sacrificing backward compatibility, but offering drastically increased performance) strategies. 
However, Shapiro and Varian (1999) conceptualize these as decisions based on technological 
restrictions. The argument is that significant performance increases can only be secured by using the 
latest technology, which in turn makes it more difficult or costly to maintain backward compatibility. 
In our empirical setting, backward compatibility is achieved without any performance losses (i.e. an 
old game runs just as well on a new console as on an old one), so that one might assume that 
backward compatibility is perfect and that technological improvements affect demand in general, 
but not the effect of backward compatibility. In other words, for perfect compatibility the degree of 
substitutability between old and new-generation games is independent of the technological gap 
between the old and the new generation console.  
However, the degree of substitutability rests on the extent to which games exploit the technical 
capabilities of a particular console. As games for the old generation were designed with a different 
set of technological restrictions, new games will differ significantly in their performance especially if 
the set of restrictions imposed by the current generation console has changed considerably (Shy 
1996). Our empirical setting lets us identify the relative importance of technological improvement 
and backward compatibility if both are present.  
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We expect technological progress and backward compatibility to be substitutes – however, unlike 
Shapiro and Varian (1999) we assume substitutability to be consumer-driven rather technologically 
determined. The degree of substitutability of old and new games depends on the relative 
performance of the two game generations and backward compatibility. As a large technological 
improvement on the hardware side permits the design of better (i.e. more elaborately programmed) 
games, an old game will be a worse substitute as the technological frontier is pushed out. We thus 
expect technological progress to have a moderating effect on both the demand- and supply side 
effects of backward compatibility, which is summarized in Hypotheses 3a and 3b: 
Hypothesis 3a:  The positive effect of backward compatibility on hardware demand is negatively 
moderated by the degree of technological progress between generations. 
Hypothesis 3b:  The negative effect of backward compatibility on software supply is negatively 
moderated by the degree of technological progress between generations.  
4. Data and estimation model 
4.1. Data 
Data sources 
The core data set for our analysis comes from the market research firm NPD Group and consists of 
monthly unit sales and revenues in the market for handheld game consoles in the U.S. for the period 
from 1/1995 to 11/2007.9 While, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the data about 
handheld game consoles, NPD data on video consoles has already been used for several other 
studies (Shankar and Bayus 2003, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009, Stremersch 
and Binken 2009, Mollick 2012).  
Data on games for the different platforms is also supplied by NPD Group. The software data consists 
of monthly unit sales and revenue data for all available game titles. For each game title, the 
associated platform is reported. Note that game data is assigned on a platform (not console) level. 
We define a platform by a common game format. A platform can therefore consist of a single 
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 We include hardware-only sales, i.e. just the console, and packages comprising a console and a game. Both 
are treated equally in the analysis as (i) package prices do not differ significantly from that of single 
consoles and (ii) a clear separation is not possible with our data. Moreover, many consoles are rarely sold 
on their own. 
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console (as for the Game Boy Color) or a family of consoles (as for the Game Boy and Game Boy 
Pocket) that use the same game format but are distinct regarding their hardware sales.10 
Data on technical characteristics of the different consoles are also matched to our data. We use two 
variables representing the key dimensions that influence user perception: CPU speed as a proxy for 
processing power of the console and weight as a proxy for the console’s mobility. The major data 
source for these technical characteristics is Forster (2005, pp. 212-214). This is completed with 
specifications from suppliers’ websites, console databases and console information websites. 
All prices are deflated to enable comparison of console and game prices over the entire period. We 
use the U.S. deflator provided by the International Monetary Fund.11 We use monthly population 
estimates from the U.S. census bureau to proxy for market potential. Finally, we use USD-JPY 
exchange rates from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service12 for a price instrument discussed later. 
Variables 
The variables are described in Table 2 and Table 3 reports summary statistics. In line with Corts and 
Lederman (2009), we eliminate the influence from outdated consoles selling remainders or products 
that never reached a wider audience by considering only devices that sold more than 500 units in a 
given month.13 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Market shares in the market for handheld game consoles      ( )   are directly calculated by dividing 
the monthly unit sales of console   by the total units sold in a given month. To derive     and    , we 
have to define potential market size first. Unlike Clements and Ohashi (2005), who use the TV 
households to determine the number of potential buyers, we use the U.S. population numbers as 
several people in a household can own handheld consoles and handheld use is independent of TV 
ownership. From this, we derive    , which is a console’s market share of the market potential
14 and 
   , the market share of the outside good, i.e. the share of potential consumers that do not have a 
                                                          
10
 The other platforms consisting of two consoles are Game Boy Advance and Game Boy Advance SP, Nintendo 
DS and Nintendo DS Lite, game.com and game.com Pocket Pro, N-Gage and N-Gage QD, as well as 
Playstation Portable and Playstation Portable Slim. There are no platforms with three or more consoles in 
our data set. 
11
 We used the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for this. 
12
 Available at http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/. 
13
 The mean monthly total number of units sold is 627,068. 
14
 The market potential is defined as the size of the population minus the number of people who already 
bought a handheld console. 
12 
console and do not buy one in the given time period. By cumulating the unit sales data of hardware 
sales, we also derive each platform’s hardware installed base     
  15 16. Finally, we divide revenue 
by units to calculate each console’s average monthly price    . All prices are reported in 1995 USD. 
Software variety     is taken from the NPD data. For every platform we count the number of game 
titles with positive sales to obtain   . Therefore,     can decline over time if game titles are no 
longer sold. We also create the software installed base of the compatible preceding 
generation        
  .17 
The last set of variables concerns the hardware characteristics of the handheld consoles. The dataset 
covers a twelve-year period in which technological progress for handheld game consoles was 
remarkable. For example, the mean CPU speed of active consoles grew from 3.93 MHz in 01/1995 to 
187.43 MHz in 12/2007. As the data covers the entire period this causes problems in comparing 
devices’ capabilities. Comparing a 2007 console that is technically below average to the best device 
from 1995 would make the first one look far too good. We therefore normalize all variables 
containing technical data by the characteristics of contemporaneously active consoles. This is done 
by calculating yearly mean values and standard deviations for CPU speed and console weight. The 
yearly mean values and standard deviations obtained were then used to construct a z-score for each 
console. Finally,         
    is derived as the percentage improvement of the CPU speed compared 
to the CPU speed of the compatible parent generation.18 
4.2. Model specification 
We estimate both hardware demand and software supply. In line with prior work on indirect 
network effects, we use a structural model to estimate hardware demand and a reduced-form 
model to estimate software supply (Nair et al. 2004, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 
2009). The two estimation models are derived below. 
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 We do not depreciate the installed base as (absolute) console performance does not deteriorate over time. 
16
 At the start of our dataset (1/1995), Nintendo’s Game Boy and Sega’s Game Gear have had already been on 
the market since 8/1998 and 1/1991. We therefore use data from http://vgchartz.com to derive the initial 
installed base of 12.7 respectively 2.9 million units for the Game Boy and the Game Gear. Data is derived by 
weighing the lifetime sales for Americas with the consoles’ 1995 U.S. share from total Americas sales. 
17
 As for the hardware installed base, the software installed base for Game Boy and Game Gear is not directly 
available in our dataset. We therefore assume that the number of software titles sold per console in the 
years prior to the beginning of our dataset equals the number of software titles sold for each console in 
1995. 
18
 We set this variable to zero if there is no active parent generation. 
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Hardware demand 
We model the demand side of the market using a structural model for hardware demand. Our model 
extends the discrete-choice model for differentiated products used by Clements and Ohashi (2005) 
and Corts and Lederman (2009) with measures of backward compatibility. We assume that each 
potential adopter   of handheld video consoles maximizes its utility by choosing the highest      
where     represents the different handheld consoles and     represents the outside option of 
not buying a console. The consumer’s utility function has the following (additive) functional form: 
                               
                       
                 [        
           
  ] 
                      [           
  ] 
(1) 
The first part of the utility function represents the baseline model that does not consider backward 
compatibility: utility depends on observed product characteristics    , the console price    , software 
variety   
19  unobserved characteristics    , and the idiosyncratic error term     , which can be 
interpreted as the difference of consumer  ’s valuation and the mean utility. 
This model is extended to capture the effects of backward compatibility. First, the installed 
base        
   of the prior generation’s compatible games is added. This variable is used to test 
Hypothesis 1 and we expect it to have a positive influence on the buyer’s selection decision. Second, 
we add the improvement factor over the compatible parent         
    and its interaction with 
installed base         
           
  . The improvement factor expresses the relative increase in CPU 
speed compared to the CPU speed of the earlier generation. We expect         
    to have a 
positive effect on utility as a technological leap stimulates demand for a new product generation. In 
line with Hypothesis 3a however, we expect the interaction term to have a negative effect on the 
buyer’s utility. Further, we add console age     as well as an interaction term of installed base and 
console age,            
  . For console age, we expect a negative influence as older consoles are less 
attractive to the remaining non-adopters. We also expect a negative coefficient for the interaction 
term between console age and installed base, as we expect the effect of a backward compatible 
installed base to be more important in the launch phase of a new platform generation.  
As in Clements and Ohashi (2005), we assume      to be identically and independently distributed 
with an extreme value distribution function to generate a nested logit model (Berry 1994). Potential 
adopters decide first to buy a handheld game console or not, and if they decide to buy one, they 
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 As already noted we distinguish between consoles   and platforms   which can consist of multiple consoles 
using the same game format. 
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then select a specific console. In contrast to a simple logit model, substitution patterns can therefore 
differ between the decision of buying a console and the decision which console to buy. 
Setting the utility of the outside good equal to zero (Berry 1994), we get a linear regression 
equation: 
   (   )    (   )                        (     ( )  )   
                                         
                [        
           
  ]   
                                        [           
  ] 
(2) 
Software supply 
We follow prior literature when estimating software supply (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and 
Lederman 2009). Software supply is expressed by the variety of different game titles     available 
for a specific platform. We estimate the following reduced-form equation: 
              
           [        
  ]       
                   
             
      [        
           
  ]    [           
  ] 
(3) 
The first line of the equation is the base model with    being brand-specific dummies,     
   the 
installed base of console of the current generation,     the age of the platform, and     an error 
term. We allow hardware installed base to interact with platform age (Clements and Ohashi 2005). 
We extend the model with the same measures of backward compatibility as for the demand 
estimation. Following Hypothesis 2, we expect        
   to negatively affect software supply as the 
installed base of backward compatible software might partly substitute for demand for new game 
titles. Further, from Hypotheses 3b we expect the interaction term of        
   with relative 
performance increase to be positive as they reduce the importance of backward compatibility on the 
demand side and we therefore expect less substitution. Finally, we again allow for the interaction of 
our measure of backward compatibility with platform age to allow for changing importance of 
backward compatibility over time. 
4.3. Instruments 
Hardware demand 
The potential endogeneity of the three variables within-group share      ( )  , price    , and 
software variety     requires the identification of appropriate instruments. We use the set of 
instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederman (2009). Within-group 
share is obviously correlated with the error term     as it contains part of the dependent variable    . 
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As     is known to firms and consumers in the market (but not to the econometrician), differences in 
unobserved quality might lead to different price setting and thus a correlation of the console price 
    and    . Finally, autocorrelation of     leads to a positive correlation between     and the 
measure of software variety   . 
First, we use exchange rates between the U.S. and Japan as a cost side instrument for prices as many 
consoles come from Japan. Exchange rates seem a valid price instrument as their change would 
probably lead to price adjustment in the U.S. market. However, it does not allow for identifying 
effects at the console level. 
Further, we use the average age of software titles currently available on the market to instrument 
for within-group share and console price. A high average age of games is a sign for missing supply of 
new game titles. Hence, we expect negative correlations of average software age both with within-
group share as a lack of new games reduces the console’s relative attractiveness and with console 
price as console manufacturers may try to reduce counter this adverse effect by lowering prices. 
Finally, we construct several instruments that measure the extent of competition faced by a 
platform (Berry et al. 1995). We use the sum of competing hardware characteristics,20 the total 
number of competing platforms, the number of competing platforms within a company, and the 
number of competing platforms within the same generation as instruments. Following Corts and 
Lederman (2009), these instruments are expected to be correlated with each of the three 
endogenous variables: with the within-group share as they affect utility of different options, with 
software variety as they influence incentives to provide game titles, and with price as they affect the 
ability to raise prices. 
Software supply 
The installed base of hardware     
   is possibly endogenous as unobserved shocks in the software 
market might lead to increased software entry but also to increased hardware adoption. We use the 
instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) to account for endogeneity. The average age 
of software titles on the market serves as an instrument, although the direction in which the 
instrument works is not clear. A high average software age could either indicate profitable 
opportunities or tough competition. We also use squared platform age and an interaction term 
between platform age and average software age as supply-side instruments. 
                                                          
20
 We use the sums of the competing consoles’ cumulative CPU speed and weight. 
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5. Results 
The 2SLS estimation results are reported in Table 4 (hardware demand) and Table 5 (software 
supply).21 Columns 4-1 and 5-1 report results without the software installed base, 4-2 and 5-2 
include just the linear term of the software installed base, and 4-3 and 5-3 include both the 
interaction terms and the hardware improvement factor. In all specifications, we use brand 
dummies to control for unobserved brand-specific effects as well as calendar month dummies to 
control for the strong seasonality in console sales. All 2SLS estimations are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 AND TABLE 5 HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
We first discuss results for the direct effect of backward compatibility (Hypothesis 1 and 2) before 
turning to the moderating effect of technological progress (Hypothesis 3a/3b). 
The control variables in the instrumented estimation results have the expected signs over the 
different specifications. With increasing age, demand as well as supply goes down. The interaction 
term of age and the installed base of compatible parent software is only significant for the demand 
side, confirming the expectation that the importance of backward compatibility declines over time. 
Further, the industry exhibits indirect network effects as the availability of more software variety     
positively influences demand and the availability of a larger hardware installed base in turn increases 
software variety. We find negative price elasticity of demand and a strong positive seasonal effect 
(not reported) in November and December for both demand and supply.22 Higher CPU speed 
increases demand, while higher console weight generally decreases demand. These results give us 
confidence in our model.  
5.1. Effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply 
We now discuss the first-order effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply. As discussed 
above, we expect backward compatibility to work through the installed base        
   of games for 
the parent generation. 
                                                          
21
 The corresponding OLS regression results are available from the authors and show the same sign and 
significance for the hypothesis tests. 
22
 As the right-hand side of the demand model is the mean utility of console   in month  , the magnitudes of 
the coefficients for the demand model cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way (Corts and Lederman, 
2009). We therefore compare the strengths of different effects or discuss marginal effects from exogenous 
changes of a console’s backward compatibility. 
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Hardware demand 
We first observe that        
   has a significantly positive coefficient for both specifications (4-2) and 
(4-3), which supports Hypothesis 1. For specification (4-3), we compare the effect of backward 
compatibility with indirect network effects from software variety   : one extra game title for the 
current generation has the same impact on demand as 82,979 game titles sold for the parent 
generation.23 Applying this to the case of the Game Boy Advance, at the launch in June 2001 an 
installed base of 45.6 million compatible Game Boy Color games corresponded to the availability of 
550 game titles for the new generation. In fact, at launch only 21 game titles were available for the 
Game Boy Advance and it took until August 2004 for 550 game titles to be available on the market. 
Software supply 
Adding        
   to the baseline specification as in estimation (5-2), we do not see any significant 
effect from backward compatibility. However, in the full specification (5-3), we obtain a significant 
negative effect of        
   on software variety24. For each million games in the installed base, 1.2 
game titles less would be offered on the market. Again looking at the example of the Game Boy 
Advance, the installed base of 45.6 million compatible Game Boy Color games would reduce 
software supply by 54 titles at its launch date. This implies that absent an installed base, 75 games 
would have been available immediately from the launch of the Game Boy Advance. 
5.2. Backward compatibility and technological progress 
After discussing the direct effect of backward compatibility, we now turn to the interaction between 
backward compatibility and technological progress. 
Hardware demand 
Our results support Hypothesis 3a, as the interaction term has a significantly negative coefficient. 
Combining the counteracting effects of the installed base and the interaction term for specification 
(4-3), we see that backward compatibility has a positive effect if the percentage increase in CPU 
speed compared to the compatible parent generation is smaller than 363%. The largest 
technological leap between two succeeding generations in our data set is the switch from the Game 
Boy Advance SP to the Nintendo DS. For this generation change, CPU speed increased from 16.7 MHz 
to 67 MHz, an increase of 301%. Here, backward compatibility played a much weaker (although still 
positive) role. This coincides with the observation that the Playstation Portable, which entered the 
                                                          
23
 The average unit sales of games in our sample are 118,619. 
24
 This is intuitive as we find a time-varying effect in (5-3), suggesting that a simple linear term is misspecified. 
Indeed, we find strong serial correlation in the error term in specification (5-1). 
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market four months later, was the only console to successfully challenge Nintendo’s dominance in 
handheld consoles market – with a much improved technology and up against a less influential 
installed base. 
Software supply 
The results from specification (5-3) strongly support Hypothesis 3b that higher technological 
progress between generations reduces the supply-decreasing effect of backward compatibility. We 
see a substitutive effect from backward compatibility as long as the technological leap is smaller 
than 198%. Therefore, the Nintendo DS with an increase in CPU speed of 301% more than outweighs 
the substitutive effect. 
6. Backward compatibility to sustain dominance 
Our results suggest a strong effect of backward compatibility on the demand of new hardware 
generations. Since Nintendo was the only firm to launch successive console generations and 
therefore the only firm to report a positive installed base of backward compatible games, we ask if 
backward compatibility was a useful means of sustaining a dominant market position over multiple 
product generations. To isolate this effect however, we need to rule out that backward compatibility 
simply proxies for other unobserved factors – the Nintendo effect. We address this in two ways: 
First, we discuss the brand dummies in our regressions that aim to capture unobserved, brand-
specific factors. Second, we run a counterfactual experiment by assigning one of the unsuccessful 
consoles, the Game.com console, the installed base of the then dominant console, the Game Boy. 
6.1. The Nintendo effect 
Table 6 reports the brand dummies for all players in the handheld game console market, with 
Nintendo the base category.  
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
While Sony’s brand dummy has a positive and significant sign – suggesting that both brand equity 
and technological advance played a role in successfully challenging Nintendo, the other dummies 
show no clear pattern. This implies that Nintendo’s reputation does not significantly explain its 
success in repeatedly holding off competition. One explanation for Sony’s success (and the others’ 
failure) would be that Nintendo’s reputation suffered significantly just prior to the introduction of 
the PSP, which would lead to a significant and positive brand dummy for Sony as it measures the 
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reputation relative to Nintendo. However, there is no anecdotal evidence for this in the relevant 
time period. 
Another consideration is that Nintendo’s reputation may have grown over time and that the 
backward compatible installed base (which grew more or less constantly throughout our sample) 
simply proxies for this reputation increase rather than a ‘real’ effect of backward compatibility. 
However, as the Sony PSP entered at the very end of the sample, this would make its success all the 
more improbable as it would have to be based on an implausibly high brand reputation vis-à-vis 
Nintendo. However, to alleviate this possible bias, we run our preferred regressions (4-3 and 5-3) 
using the rolling software installed base        
   of the three years before the observation month 
instead of the overall installed base. The results are shown in Table 7 and show a qualitatively similar 
picture as our baseline results, rendering this alternative explanation less likely. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
6.2. A counterfactual experiment 
To assess if backward compatibility could indeed have played a role in sustaining Nintendo’s market 
leadership by intensifying the startup problem for challenging platforms, we run a counterfactual 
experiment in which we hypothetically assume that games for the Game Boy generation can be 
played on the Game.com console (and Nintendo consoles).25 In reality, the Game.com console was 
not backward compatible to any other parent console and was a commercial failure. Following Corts 
and Lederman (2009), we derive the counterfactual as follows. First, mean utility     for console   at 
time   is derived from the regression results of our preferred specification (4-3). With the nested 
logit formula discussed in Berry (1994), the implied market shares can be obtained as follows: 
 
    
   (   (   )⁄ )
  (      )
 (4) 
with   ∑    (   (   )⁄ ) . In a next step, we assume that the Game.com console, which was 
launched in 9/1997 could have played titles for the Game Boy. The installed base of compatible 
software titles for the parent generation        
  , the performance increase of the Game.com CPU 
compared to the Game Boy CPU         
   , and the interaction terms from equation (2) are 
adjusted accordingly. We then use the updated values to recalculate mean utilities and implied 
                                                          
25
 Such a move of mandating compatibility with a promising entrant could also be imposed by an antitrust 
authority as a pro-competitive measure (Shapiro 1996). 
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market shares. We repeat these steps for every month in the first year since the launch of the 
Game.com console and report average changes and the actual outcome in the top half of Table 8. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
First off, we observe that backward compatibility leads to an increase in total demand: the average 
additional demand of 231,707 Game.com units is twice as large as the aggregate decrease in 
demand for the competing platforms of 114,809 units. This is intuitive as overall network effects 
have increased. Without backward compatibility, the technologically superior Game.com never takes 
off and the outdated Game Boy Pocket maintains a dominant position, as can be seen from 
Game.com’s actual market share of 2.68%. Assigning the Game Boy’s installed base to Game.com 
changes the dynamics of the market drastically, and Game.com’s counterfactual market share is 
almost as high as Nintendo’s actual one.26 
In the bottom part of Table 8, we add the indirect effect of backward compatibility, which we found 
to decrease supply of new games. We proceed as follows. We first simulate backward compatibility 
of the Game.com console by changing the installed bases analogous to hardware demand. We then 
use the coefficients from our supply estimation (5-3) to predict the number of available games   . 
We finally substitute this (lower) number of available games in the utility function     of the 
demand-side equation and can again derive implied changes in units sold and in market shares. 
The indirect effect moderates the direct effect somewhat (as game providers for Game.com would 
have been deterred by the installed base of backward compatible games serving as imperfect 
substitutes). However, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, so that backward compatibility 
would still have helped the Game.com console capture a large chunk of the market at the time. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we study the effects of backward compatibility in a market with indirect network 
effects, the U.S. handheld game console industry. Backward compatibility helped the market leader 
Nintendo maintain their market leadership over multiple generations despite having an inferior 
technology in many instances. Backward compatibility in this market works through the installed 
base of games for a compatible parent generation and its strength is affected by the rate of 
technological improvement between successive generations. 
                                                          
26
 Note that we maintain Game Boy’s backward compatibility so that Game Boy and Game.com have equal 
installed bases. 
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On the demand side, our results lend support to the role of backward compatibility. If a new 
generation is backward compatible with the old one, the installed base of games for the prior 
generation increases sales for the new generation console. However, large technological 
improvements across generations come at the cost of consumers valuing backward compatibility 
less as their utility from using the old complementary products is comparatively low. Therefore, 
benefits from large technological improvement are partially offset by the reduced benefits from 
backward compatibility. On the supply side, we find that backward compatibility lowers the supply 
of new software, and that this effect is less pronounced for consoles with higher technological 
progress, which suggests that there is a (previously not identified) “dark side” to backward 
compatibility. 
By jointly analyzing hardware demand and software supply, we identify a tradeoff between the 
demand-enhancing effect of backward compatibility directly affecting hardware demand and the 
demand-reducing effect that works indirectly through reduced software variety for a platform. We 
find that the demand-increasing effect clearly outweighs the demand-decreasing effect. 
Could backward compatibility have stabilized market structure in the U.S. handheld console market 
by giving Nintendo a head start for every new generation? Sony’s PSP, the most successful 
challenger, entered with a much superior technology at a time when Nintendo had just made a 
significant technological leap from their previous generation, which is in line with our results that 
backward compatibility matters less if the generations are very different technologically, so that 
Nintendo was comparably more vulnerable at that junction. To further substantiate the claim that 
backward compatibility helped Nintendo maintain a dominant position over technologically superior 
challengers, we run a counterfactual and assign Nintendo’s Game Boy installed base to a 
technologically superior, but ultimately unsuccessful challenger, the Game.com console. We find 
that if Game.com had been backward compatible, market leadership would have been reversed. 
Our work relates to the literature on entry deterrence, as backward compatibility can discourage 
firms from entering a market or at least prevent them from attaining large market shares. While 
there are many theoretical models of strategic entry deterrence (Dixit 1980, Klemperer 1987, 
Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Salop 1979, Haan 2003), empirical studies of entry deterrence are rare in 
industrial organization (Schmalensee 1978, Smiley 1988). Strategy and marketing scholars have 
focused on limit pricing (Srinivasan 1991), reputation (Clark and Montgomery 1998) and excess 
capacity (Harrigan 1981), while Gruca and Sudharshan (1995) integrate a wide variety of entry 
deterrence strategies in their conceptual framework, in part referring to product portfolio choices 
(brand proliferation, preannouncement, switching costs). However, technological parameters are 
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not typically considered potential strategic instruments for entry deterrence.27 This is surprising as in 
technology-intensive industries entry is a salient phenomenon, often replacing current leaders in the 
process of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942). In this light, our results have both managerial 
and policy implications. Managers in network industries must consider backward compatibility an 
important parameter that helps stabilize market shares across generations and establish persistent 
market leadership. Judiciously managing the tradeoff between backward compatibility and 
technological progress is thus a key challenge for technology strategists.  
                                                          
27
 An exception is Church and Gandal (1996), who study compatibility as a means of entry deterrence in a 
theoretical model.  
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Figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Dual effect of backward compatibility 
 
 
Figure 2: Monthly market shares from 1995 to 2007 
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Table 1: Mobile handheld consoles sold between 1995 and 2007 
Console Platform Backward U.S.  Manufacturer Hardware 
  Compatibility launch  CPU 
[MHz] 
Weight 
[g] 
Generation IV       
  Game Boy Game  
Boy 
No 
8/1989 
Nintendo 4.2 
300 
  Game Boy Pocket 9/1996 148 
  Game Gear Game Gear No 1/1991 Sega 3.6 500 
Generation V       
  Game Boy Color GB Color Yes 11/1998 Nintendo 8.4 188 
  Virtual Boy Virtual Boy No 8/1995 Nintendo 20 760 
  game.com 
game.com No 
9/1997 
Tiger 10 
380 
  game.com Pocket Pro 12/1999 n/a 
Generation VI       
  Game Boy Advance Game Boy 
Advance 
Yes 
6/2001 
Nintendo 16.7 
180 
  Game Boy Advance SP 3/2003 142 
  Neo Geo Pocket Color NGP Color No 8/1999 SNK 6.14 145 
  N-Gage 
N-Gage No 
10/2003 
Nokia 104 
137 
  N-Gage QD 8/2004 143 
Generation VII       
  DS 
DS Yes 
11/2004 
Nintendo 67 
275 
  DS Lite 6/2006 218 
  Playstation Portable Playstation 
Portable 
No 
3/2005 
Sony 333 
280 
  Playstation Portable Slim 9/2007 189 
 
  
28 
Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
    Market share of console j at time t (relative to market potential) 
    Market share of the outside good (no console purchase) 
     ( )   Within-group market share (share within the handheld market) 
    Available software titles for current format 
    Deflated console price (1995 prices) 
   
      
 Normalized weight of the console 
   
    Normalized CPU speed of the console  
    
   Installed base of consoles for the current platform format (millions) 
       
   Installed base of games for the compatible parent platform (millions) 
    Age of the console (months) 
        
    Percentage improvement of CPU to compatible parent platform 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
   (        ) 502 -8.69 2.09 -13.07 -4.69 
   (     ( )  ) 502 -2.33 1.97 -7.71 0.00 
    502 259.04 233.27 3.00 844.00 
    502 95.94 54.69 20.39 298.23 
   
      
 502 0.00 0.99 -1.57 3.52 
   
    502 -0.01 0.98 -1.44 3.25 
    
   502 11.68 10.35 0.00 34.18 
       
   502 22.78 31.56 0.00 106.83 
    502 35.18 30.67 0.00 131.00 
        
    502 0.65 0.89 0.00 3.02 
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Table 4: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   (   )    (   ) 
INDEPENDENT (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) 
VARIABLES    
    
SW installed base        
   [millions]  0.0149*** 0.0141** 
 (0.00125) (0.00708) 
Interaction term        
           
      -0.00388*** 
  (0.00139) 
HW improvement         
      0.897*** 
  (0.197) 
Interaction term        
         -0.000314*** 
  (9.56e-05) 
Console age     -0.0239*** -0.0109*** -0.00489** 
(0.00432) (0.00235) (0.00233) 
Number of available games    0.00458*** 0.000775** 0.00117** 
(0.000608) (0.000301) (0.000534) 
Deflated price     -0.00885* -0.00897*** -0.00708** 
(0.00454) (0.00256) (0.00356) 
ln(within-group share      ( )  ) 0.795*** 0.737*** 0.655*** 
(0.116) (0.0617) (0.0931) 
Normalized console weight    
      
 0.261* -0.254*** -0.322*** 
(0.155) (0.0921) (0.102) 
Normalized CPU speed    
    0.174 0.157** 0.169* 
(0.114) (0.0682) (0.0854) 
Observations 502 502 502 
R-squared 0.856 0.952 0.958 
Hansen’s J 8.171 34.37 34.45 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Brand 
dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
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Table 5: Software supply estimates (2SLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:    
INDEPENDENT (5-1) (5-2) (5-3) 
VARIABLES    
    
SW installed base        
   [millions]  0.00889 -1.185*** 
 (0.0862) (0.303) 
Interaction term        
           
      0.597*** 
  (0.0584) 
HW improvement         
      -33.25*** 
  (12.23) 
Interaction term        
          -0.00297 
  (0.00371) 
Format age      -1.305*** -1.298*** -2.080*** 
(0.168) (0.173) (0.117) 
HW installed base     
   35.46*** 35.45*** 39.00*** 
(0.646) (0.635) (1.195) 
Interaction term     
       -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.158*** 
(0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0126) 
Observations 437 437 437 
R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.982 
Hansen’s J 12.25 13.04 18.15 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Brand 
dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
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Table 6: Omitted brand dummies from estimation (4-3) 
BRAND  
Sega 0.576** 
 (0.248) 
Tiger -0.739*** 
 (0.230) 
SNK 0.192 
 (0.395) 
Nokia 0.319 
 (0.759) 
Sony 2.967*** 
 (0.374) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
32 
Table 7a: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of         
    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   (   )    (   ) 
INDEPENDENT (7-a) 
VARIABLES  
  
SW installed base        
   [millions] 0.0171*** 
(0.00546) 
Interaction term        
           
    -0.00916** 
(0.00360) 
HW improvement         
    1.267*** 
(0.295) 
Interaction term        
       -0.000370*** 
(0.000107) 
Console age     -0.00553** 
(0.00236) 
Number of available games    0.000238 
(0.000733) 
Deflated price     -0.00468 
(0.00398) 
ln(within-group share      ( )  ) 0.624*** 
(0.0933) 
Normalized console weight    
      
 -0.372*** 
(0.112) 
Normalized CPU speed    
    0.0733 
(0.0979) 
Observations 502 
R-squared 0.952 
Hansen’s J 29.45 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Brand 
dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
  
33 
Table 7b: Software supply estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of         
   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:    
INDEPENDENT (7-b) 
VARIABLES  
  
SW installed base        
   [millions] -1.205*** 
(0.325) 
Interaction term        
           
    0.00217 
(0.00532) 
HW improvement         
    -45.50*** 
(16.42) 
Interaction term        
        0.814*** 
(0.131) 
Format age      -1.770*** 
(0.150) 
HW installed base     
   37.94*** 
(1.015) 
Interaction term     
       -0.162*** 
(0.0111) 
Observations 437 
R-squared 0.979 
Hansen’s J 2.929 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Brand 
dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
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Table 8: Average monthly changes (9/1997-8/1998) assuming that the Game.com console is 
backward compatible with software for the Game Boy 
 Game.com Game Boy 
Pocket 
Virtual 
Boy28 
Game Gear 
Actual market shares 2.68% 89.03% 5.64% 4.84% 
Predicted market shares base model 2.87% 74.54% 12.42% 10.60% 
Direct effect of backward compatibility     
Unit change prediction vs. counterfactual + 231,707 - 83,111 - 19,193 - 12,505 
Market share change prediction vs. 
counterfactual 
+ 71.74% - 55.29% - 8.90% - 7.84% 
Indirect effect of backward compatibility     
Additional unit change - 23,576 + 6,086 + 1,153 + 892 
Additional market share change - 4.71% + 3.70% +0. 51% +0. 52% 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Nintendo‘s Virtual Boy has only been on the market for the first six months since the launch of the 
Game.com console. 
